

Populism's Roots: Economic and Cultural Explanations in Democracies of Europe (PRECEDE). Research Agenda, Concepts, and Data.

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Working Paper 1

Introduction

The aim of the Precede project is to investigate the roots of European populism and set up a toolkit for national and EU organisations to respond to populist demands. This interdisciplinary consortium combines, in an original way, political, sociological and economic explanations to clarify how voters' demands and populist parties' positions match up. While current explanations of populism tend to focus on its cultural manifestations (opposition to migration, emphasis on the national identity etc.), this project investigates populism's deeper cultural and socio-economic roots and isolates the elements that trigger support towards populism.

In past decades, exploring the roots of (right-wing) populism has been under close examination by political scientists (Mudde, 2016), but since the result of the UK referendum on EU membership (the Brexit vote), populism has received renewed interest from economists, sociologists and other social scientists. Key thinkers in these fields view the rising support for populism as a key challenge for Europe, as it reflects a deep crisis in European societies, in both economic and social (Dodd et al., 2017; Rodrick, 2018). Our project contributes to open questions regarding the 'why', 'who' and 'how' behind the rise of populism.

First, the PRECEDE project combines cultural and economic explanations of why voters are increasingly appealed by populism. The cultural narrative postulates that (right-wing, in particular) populist support is mostly driven by the loss of a nationalistic and religious identity that is accompanied by a rising support for authoritarian values and anti-migration feelings, especially amongst the older cohorts (Norris and Inglehart, 2019; Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018). This cultural explanation is often contrasted with the socio-economic narrative for which the rising support towards populism is a reaction of 'globalisation's losers', namely of those have lost from the global economy (Bornschieer & Kriesi, 2012; Manow, 2018; Rodrick, 2018). However, there are overlooked links between the economic and cultural narratives (Hopkin, 2017), because the loss of subjective social status that drives voters towards populism has both cultural and socio-economic roots (Gidron & Hall, 2017). Furthermore, we believe that several cultural/societal issues that gained importance during the last years such as values and attitudes towards topics like LGBTQ+ and gender equality are understudied in its relationship with populism.

Second, the PRECEDE project integrates sociology with political science, allowing us to fully appreciate who supports populism across European countries. In current studies 'globalisation losers' tend to be operationalised exclusively as unemployed people, welfare claimants or traditional working classes (Norris & Inglehart, 2019; Rooduijn, 2018). By integrating the latest evidence from the social sciences, the project considers instead that populism may be bolstered by the squeezed middle (namely the intermediate class with a lowering socio-economic position), the rising financial insecurity affecting large segments of the European population (Eurofound, 2017), and the rising income and wealth inequality in Europe (Atkinson, 2014).

Third, the PRECEDE project clarifies how support for populism is linked to parties' positions. The economic environment in Europe has shifted populist agendas (Azmanova, 2011), with

left-wing and right-wing populist parties moving towards pro-welfare social populism (Ivaldi, 2015; March & Rommerskirchen, 2015). Since populist European parties tend to have various positions on the two-dimensional landscape that constitutes economic and cultural cleavage (Bakker et al., 2019; Rooduijn et al., 2020), looking at how populist voters' positions vis-à-vis policy issues, are related to the populist parties' positions on issues will allow us to identify the 'push' and 'pull' triggers for populism.

PRECEDE's methodologically cutting-edge project tests new explanations of populism using large cross-national email panels derived from users of Voting Advice Applications (VAAs). The project analyses existing secondary data, as well as collect primary data across 10 European countries: United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Italy, Germany, Spain, Romania, France, Sweden, Hungary and Czech Republic. These countries represent different 'welfare state models' and have different types of populism (left/right; in government and in opposition), allowing us to identify common patterns and differences across Europe. As our new VAA-generated data will be analysed alongside existing probability data, this study combines the innovation of using online generated panels with the robustness of probability sampling, exploiting the latest developments in the electoral studies' sector. Moreover, the analysis of VAAs (namely voters' opinions on parties) allows examining voters' responses to parties' issues (both economic and cultural), thereby clarifying the demand-and-supply nexus of populism.

Our research is guided by the following research questions:

Q.1 How do socio-economic and cultural triggers of populist voting change both across countries and across the political spectrum (left-wing and right-wing populism)?

Q.2 How do populist parties' agendas (supply) influence populist voters (demand), and vice versa?

Q.3 How are 'push' factors of populist voting transformed into 'pull' factors, which move voters away from populist voting?

Populism has been identified as one of the greatest threats in recent times to European societies' stability; yet, simultaneously, populism stems from these societies' growing economic and personal instability (Algan et al., 2017). European citizens report a growing dissatisfaction with their standards of living and work conditions (Eurobarometer, 2014) that can result in, at times, declining support for EU and national democratic institutions (Algan et al., 2017). Crucially, the rise of populism is a cross-European phenomenon that also occurs in countries with extensive social systems.

The PRECEDE project fundamentally contributes to ongoing policy work that addresses the roots of populist demand at the EU level. To respond to the growing dissatisfaction in European societies, the EU has recently launched the European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR), which sets 20 key principles around equal opportunities and access to the labour market, fair working conditions, and social protection and inclusion. This new social action plan attempts to rebalance the EU's output and address the EU social deficit (Garben, 2018) while also offering country-specific recommendations, which represent a powerful mechanism for influencing the direction of EU member states. PRECEDE's toolkit will contribute to the EPSR framework in various ways. It will provide new indicators for measuring social instability across Europe, assess how precarity and subjective insecurity in social status are spread across Europe, describe how inequality and insecurity affect Europe, and clarify the policy strategies that push citizens towards populist ideas ('push' factors) and those that can be put in place to counter populist demands ('pull' factors). Finally, this project also offers methodological benefits: It will

elaborate new items/indicators that can be integrated in future rounds of the Eurobarometer survey, which is used by the European Commission to inform policy directions.

Here the PRECEDE project addresses the above-mentioned academic and policy challenges for Europe through accomplishing the following objectives. PRECEDE aims to:

1. Generate primary data on populist support to be analysed in conjunction with existing secondary data;
2. Understand the various factors that trigger populist support amongst ordinary citizens and the shrinking intermediate classes;
3. Integrate cultural and socio-economic explanations of populism by focussing on the rise of subjective social status insecurity;
4. Explore the connections between demand and supply of populism by understanding push and pull factors of populism in relation to populist parties' agendas;
5. Set up a European toolkit that clarifies push and pull factors of populist voting and responses to populist demand, respectively.

1. Theoretical Framework

For the purpose of our project, PRECEDE employs the *ideational definition* of populism that conceives populism in minimal terms as a unique set of ideas based on the antagonistic relationship between 'the people' and the 'the elites' whereby populists intend to restore *popular sovereignty* (or the 'will of the people'), which appears both at the level of parties and voters (Hawkins et al., 2018). On the voter level, ideational scholars understand populism as a set of attitudes and ideas among ordinary citizens that are activated by external political, cultural or socio-economic factors. On the party level, given its chameleonic quality to adapt itself to different political ideologies (Taggart, 2002), populism is described as a 'thin-centered' ideology adjacent to radical right and left (Mudde, 2004). PRECEDE's theoretical framework offers a holistic understanding of the causes of populism: It combines (a) cultural and socio-economic factors, (b) the demand side with the supply side of populism to identify its push and pull factors, and, finally, (c) micro-/individual-level explanations with macro-level explanations (see also methodology).

There are three original elements in our proposed framework. First, the study proposes to explore the link between cultural and economic factors, which will help overcome the false notion that these two sets of explanations are in opposition (Hopkin, 2017). The loss of subjective social status amongst ordinary citizens that is behind populist support, depends both on the increasingly precarious conditions of work and on a cultural sense of estrangement (Gidron & Hall, 2017). Following this intuition, in PRECEDE's framework the connecting element between the cultural and the socio-economic factors is the declining subjective social status of voters. When exploring cultural factors, scholars generally focus on the *manifestations* of cultural cleavages between populist and non-populist voters, such as education (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018), lifestyle, religion, migration attitudes, authoritarianism and attitudes towards multiculturalism (Norris and Inglehart, 2019). PRECEDE examines instead the cultural triggers of populist voting behind these manifestations by including tested items of cultural *anomie*, namely cultural insecurity linked to processes of detraditionalisation (Achterberg & Houtman, 2009), and loss of identity, which refers to the decline of cultural capital and education-based identity (Spruyt et al., 2016).

Second, and linked to the previous point, our framework proposes a fuller understanding of the political economy of populist voting. Instead of operationalising 'globalisation losers' as those individuals who are left behind, PRECEDE tries to capture the overlooked intermediate segments of the population that have rising socio-economic and labour-market insecurity

(Antonucci et al., 2017, 2021; Jennings & Stoker, 2017). In order to do this, PRECEDE explores:




Figure 1. The theoretical framework of the study.

- Micro-level explanations, in particular:
 Individual economic factors (i.e. income/wealth; socio-economic insecurity). Socio-economic insecurity will be explored by examining aspects of financial insecurity (capacity to repay unexpected expenses; difficulty in paying rent and debt). These indicators are currently missing in cross-national analyses of populism and will greatly improve our understanding of the phenomenon.
 A multi-dimensional understanding of precarity. While the push towards populism has been explored amongst labour market outsiders (Emmenegger et al., 2015), it is key to investigate the drive towards populism by labour market insiders and ordinary workers who increasingly face the “anxiety about threat to job status” (Gallie et al., 2017, p. 37). Our innovative indicators of precarity (Antonucci et al., 2021) explore precarity beyond the fear of losing one’s job and look at the worsening conditions *in work* that affect the majority of ordinary workers in Europe, such as the level of benefits paid for sick leave, relationships with management, work–life balance, and so on (Gallie et al., 2017).
- Macro-level factors that likely affect the majority of the population (e.g. changes in welfare state spending, labour market policies, unemployment and growth) and are also thought to be behind the rise of populism (Halikiopoulou & Vlandas, 2016).

Third, PRECEDE research permits us to **establish connections between the agendas of populist parties and the demands of their voters**. Populist voting is indeed triggered by the ‘populist frame’ (Hameleers et al., 2018), namely the specific framing of populist parties’ agendas. Matching the analysis of parties’ agendas (supply) with the intentions and attitudes of voters (demand) enables us to investigate the party–voter congruence (Wall et al, 2014). To

do so, PRECEDE distinguishes between (a) voters of populist parties and (b) voters who show high support for populist ideas but do not vote for populist parties (Van Hauwaert & Van Kessel, 2018). A key 'push' factor which should be explored is the feeling that an individual is not being represented by the major parties because the issues most important to the individual do not appear in the main parties' platforms (this is called the *representation gap*). Voters can feel that, at the *input level*, their own political preferences and policy priorities (e.g. social status, labour market insecurity) are not fed into the political system (Castanho Silva & Wratil, 2019). Further, a representation gap at the input level can lead to a representation gap at the *output level*, whereby those with political power make decisions against the interests of certain groups or exclude certain agendas (Elsässer et al., 2018). With our established surveys, the project will be able to track down impacts of institutionalisation as a 'pull' factors, namely how populist parties either manage or fail to bridge the contradiction of becoming an 'established populist' party.

Defining Populism and Differentiating it from similar Concepts

Over the past two decades, populism research has seen a substantial shift from single-country or regionally focused to comparative approaches. This shift was crucial for empirical populism research due to the acceptance of the concept's ability to 'travel' (Mudde, 2017, p. 38). Yet, since this shift also involved a substantive increase in populism research as a whole, the inevitable consequence was a plurality of definitions and conceptualisations. Populism has become a buzz word. Often, it is confused with related, albeit not identical concepts such as nationalism or Euroscepticism, which calls for conceptual clarity and transparency (Rooduijn, 2019, pp. 365–366).

Although these debates seem to be a struggle about the 'true' genus of populism, they are best understood as approaches from different perspectives. Increasingly, scholars interested in the empirical analysis of party discourse and ideology make use of the so-called *ideational approach*. This conceptualisation is mainly concerned with populist ideas, discourse and style (Mudde, 2017) and defines populism as a 'unique set of ideas' (Hawkins & Kaltwasser, 2018). The approach is commonly used due to its clear-cut definition that facilitates the operationalisation of the concept.

The ideational approach sees populism as a simplified view of politics that separates the world into two fundamentally different moral camps: the 'good people' and the 'bad elite/establishment'. Populist discourse uses a simplistic narrative: ordinary people are described as virtuous and homogeneous and have an identifiable 'General Will' that should guide political decision-making. This core concept is the first subdimension of populism and referred to as *people centrism* (1). For populists, the people are oppressed by 'the establishment', a powerful minority which illegitimately controls the state. Thus, populists are strongly *anti-elitist* (2), which constitutes the second subdimension of populism (Mudde, 2004; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013). Since the fundamental difference between the people and the elite is moralistic, populists imply that the elite comes from the same group as 'the people' but has actively chosen to betray them. This is an essential detail for understanding the moralistic relationship between the core concepts of populism, as it explains how populist leaders such as Silvio Berlusconi or Donald Trump, who clearly belong to the elite, convinced their electorate that they can authentically represent the people (Mudde, 2017, pp. 30–31).

Although some argue that populism is a dangerous form of identity politics that "tends to pose a danger to democracy" (Müller, 2016, p. 3), it is important to highlight that populists evoke popular sovereignty, which stems from the concept of people-centrism. Therefore, populists are 'essentially democratic' (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013, p. 506). However, populists

have an illiberal, majority-driven form of democracy in mind that conflicts with liberal democracy and can be described as 'democratic illiberalism' (Pappas, 2014). Therefore, the central goal of populism is to move the locus of power away from the 'evil elite' and (back) to the 'good people'.

One of the biggest challenges is to differentiate populism from related concepts. Closely related to people-centrism is nativism, the idea that “natives” should exclusively inhabit the nation. As will be discussed shortly, nativism is a specific concept of right-wing populism. This means that all right-wing populist parties, but not all populist parties are nativist (Rooduijn, 2019, pp. 365–367). Populism is often confused with right-wing populism as such, but the definition is unbiased in the sense that it can be combined with any ideology. More precisely, Mudde defined populism as a “thin-centred ideology” that is attached to other “thick” ideologies (Mudde, 2004). People-centrism and anti-elitism can come in different shapes, “coloured” by the main ideology. For example, the concept of the people can have different understandings like the people as sovereign, the people as the common people or the people as nation (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013, p. 501). Similarly, populists can criticise different groups of elites. Left-wing populists, for example, tend to criticise the economic elite (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013, p. 503).

With Rooduijn demonstrates, by using parties from Italy and Greece, how populism can be distinguished from neighbouring concepts, although it may overlap with other concepts. The dotted box denotes populist parties, which are, in Italy and Greece, Syriza, Forza Italia, Movimento 5 Stelle, ANEL and Lega (Nord). A subset of those parties is far-left (Syriza) or far-right (Lega, ANEL). Yet, there are also non-populist parties that are far-left (KKE) or far-right (Golden Dawn). As discussed above, populists are “essentially democratic”, albeit “illiberal” – but this condition is not met by the two parties considered to be non-democratic extremists, communist KKE and neo-fascist Golden Dawn. Another classification is a party’s status as a challenger party: populist parties can be challengers (e.g. M5S), but other populists are quite established (FI, Lega, Syriza, ANEL). The same goes for Euroscepticism – KKE and Golden Dawn are Eurosceptic in the absence of populism.




Figure 2. Populist far left/right, Eurosceptic and challenger Parties in Italy and Greece. Source: Rooduijn 2019, 366.

Populism is frequently confused with many similar concepts, most famously with right-wing populism per se. Yet, as discussed above, populism is flexible in the sense that it can be combined with many ideologies. Neither is populism a the same as a “popular” style,

demagoguery/opportunism, being a political outsider, nationalism and authoritarianism (De Cleen et al., 2018, p. 653).

Populism and its Host Ideologies

The ideational approach works as an umbrella for many more specific conceptualisations of populism that focus on language and ideology. Researchers interested in the ideological positioning of populist parties often build upon Mudde's conceptualisation of populism as a "thin-centred ideology" (Mudde, 2004), which is embedded in the ideational approach (Mudde, 2017). By relying on Freedman's morphological understand of ideologies (Freedman, 1998a, 1998b), Mudde builds on the idea that thin-centered ideologies are different from thick ideologies since they do not offer a complex variety of answers. In Freedman's sense, ideologies are specific configurations of political concepts where particular interpretations have been selected over others. Ideologies help to de-contest these concepts, which are necessary for constructing meaningful political worlds. To speak of established ideologies, a set of shared conceptual features must become visible over time and space. Those features, mostly observable through language, will then transform into general *core concepts* that can take different roads depending on its *adjacent* and *peripheral concepts*. To speak of a distinct ideology, its core concept must be unique (Freedman, 1998b, p. 749f.). Full ideologies "provide a reasonably broad, if not comprehensive, range of answers to the political questions that societies generate" (Freedman, 1998b, p. 750). In contrast, he describes a thin ideology "as one that arbitrarily severs itself from wider ideational contexts, by the deliberate removal and replacement of concepts," exhibiting "a restricted core attached to a narrower range of political concepts". Freedman sees them as a diminished subtype of full instances, which highlights his radial understanding of ideologies. It follows then that populism, as a thin-centred ideology, needs to be combined with another host ideology, simply because its 'thin-ness' fails to provide comprehensive answer like other full or thick ideologies do. This is normally provided by the host ideology where the populist (thin) ideology is attached to. In the majority of cases, this host ideology is either the radical right or radical left ideology, as we will discuss in the next paragraphs.

Recently, scholars raised doubts about the conceptualisation of populism as a thin-centred ideology. They highlight that a set of defining attributes as well as elaboration on operationalisation is missing; it is not clear what exactly constitutes thin ideologies. Due to the concept's vagueness, nearly everything can form a thin-centred ideology, which leads to a broad and frivolous understanding of the term (Aslanidis, 2016, p. 90f.; Moffitt and Tormey, 2014, p. 383). Even Freedman himself voiced doubts as to whether populism could appropriately described as a thin-centred ideology (Freedman, 2017). Yet, we believe that Freedman's conceptualisation of ideologies is helpful in multiple ways. Seeing populism as a 'thin' ideology that is attached to a 'thick' ideology highlights its role as a secondary feature. In our analysis, a first step relies on a minimal classification of parties as populist (or not). In a second step, this "thick" ideological part, which is more important for the overall party ideology and less disputed, will be investigated. That bears the question: What is left about left-wing populism and what is right about right-wing populism?

To define left-wing and right-wing populism, we will discuss three different definitions and conceptualisations: populism, the far-right ideology and the far-left ideology. More specifically, we will show that within the far-right and far-left ideologies, populism is combined with radicalism. With the combination of those three elements, we will be able to distinguish and define our key concepts:

Right-Wing Populist Parties (RWP) = radical right + populist

Left-Wing Populist Parties (LWP) = radical left + populist

As already discussed, there are also populist parties that are neither radical left nor radical right. We will define those parties as centrist populist parties:

Centrist Populist Parties (CCP) = populist only (in the absence of radicalism)

The term centrist populism originated from Eastern European studies of populism, denoting populist parties that challenge the political mainstream, mainly driven by anti-corruption rhetoric, but located at the political centre (Učeň, 2004; Učeň et al., 2005; Havlík & Voda, 2018). We employ the term in a purely spatial sense: for us, centrist populist parties are parties that fulfil the minimal criteria of populism but are not radical in the sense that they are ideologically neither far-left nor far-right. Note, though, that this creates a somewhat fuzzy group of parties, some of them ideologically indeed hard to classify (e.g. the Italian Five Star Movement), and some of them being ideologically clearly left- or right-leaning, but without being radical (e.g. Berlusconi's parties PdL/FI).

Populism, Far-Right and Far-Left Ideologies

A clear-cut classification of populist parties across Europe based on a minimal definition of populism is currently offered by the project PopuList (Rooduijn et al., 2020). The PopuList defines populism, far-right and far-left minimally, which we share and will discuss in the following paragraphs. The dataset covers time-series data since 1990, indicating when a party started or stopped endorsing one of the elements.

The PopuList uses a binary classification for all variables. For populism, the PopuList uses the widely accepted minimal definition of Cas Mudde (2004), as discussed above, which is closely embedded in the discussion of the ideational approach to study populism. The PopuList classifies a party only as populist if it fulfils all the criteria of this minimal definition.

When it comes to the other two concepts, the far-left ideology and far-right ideology, the main challenge is to identify the ideological core that unites rather homogeneous parties belong to the respective party family. The “far” prefix works like an umbrella concept and includes everything left of centre. For example, the far-left can roughly be classified as all ideologies left of social democracy, whereas the far-right covers everything right of Christian democracy and other centre-right ideologies.

Consequently, both the far-right and the far-left ideologies cover a broad set of heterogeneous parties, ranging from anti-democratic extremist to anti-liberal, yet not anti-democratic radical parties (March & Mudde, 2005, pp. 24–25; March, 2011, pp. 10-11,16-17; Mudde, 2019, p. 75). The border between the two is qualitative: it demarcates the anti-democratic extreme right/left from the (at least theoretically) pro-democratic, yet illiberal (populist) radical right/left (Mudde, 2019, p. 94). The spatial differentiation between radicalism, which is still democratic, and extremism, which is not democratic anymore, dates back to the conceptualisation of the German Office for the Protection of the Constitution; yet, the thin line separating the two concepts is often hard to identify (Eatwell, 2000, pp. 410–411; March, 2011, p. 10). The practical consequence is that, within the far-right and far-left party family, populism is combined with radicalism, not extremism. A combination of populism with extremism would clash with the essentially democratic (albeit illiberal) core of populism. Nevertheless, defining a clear-cut line between radicalism and extremism is easier in theory than in practice. On the one hand, radical parties may only accept democracy verbally and are essentially extremists, on the other hand, extremists could use extremism as a rhetorical device to gain attention (March, 2011, pp. 16–18). This challenge may be greater for the far-left, since even the (previously more coherent) group of communist parties are now split in extremist conservative communists and

radical reform communists (ibid.). For the far-right, the distinction is often made on the grounds of the relationship with Nazism, which is undemocratic (Mudde, 2007, pp. 49–50). Consequently, parties like the German NPD are extremist and incompatible with populism (Nociar & Thomeczek, 2018).

As a result, we speak more specifically of the radical left and the radical right ideology, which can be combined with populism. These clear-cut terms shall avoid confusion for populism's relationship to extremism. By employing radicalism instead of the "far" prefix, we deviate from the terms used by the PopuList.¹ Although this may seem as a conceptual contradiction, the PopuList project employs definitions of the radical left (March, 2011) and the radical right (Mudde, 2007) and re-defines them as a far-left/far-right definitions. Roughly, those definitions can be seen as the ideological core uniting extremists and radicals.

The Far-Right Ideology: Between Extremism and Radicalism

When focusing on the host ideology of right-wing populism, we will need to focus on the radical right instead of the extremist right ideology, as argued above. Consequently, to analyse right-wing populism, it is necessary to focus on the radical ideology within the broad far-right ideology. The core concept of the radical right is nativism, understood as a combination of nationalism and xenophobia, derived from the party family's nodal point "the nation" (Mudde, 2007, p. 16). Combined with authoritarianism, the two concepts build the core of the far-right ideology (Rydgren, 2018, p. 23). The additional feature of anti-democracy demarcates the border between the radical right and extreme right (Mudde, 2007, p. 24). Thus, right-wing populism is the combination of populism with nativism and authoritarianism (see also Minkenberg, 2001, p. 3).

Nativism and Authoritarianism

Nativists believe that states should be inhabited exclusively by "native groups", which underlines its close connection with nationalism. Additionally, "non-native elements", which can be persons and ideas, are considered to be a threat, revealing xenophobic arguments. Thus, various things can be defined as "non-native"; the term can have ethnic, racial or religious meanings, but is always interpreted culturally (Mudde, 2007, p. 19). Nativism is not the same as (hierarchical) racism, in fact, nativism is often embedded in ethno-pluralism, an idea that different ethnicities can co-exist, as long as they stay within the territory of their "home nation", thus stay separated from each other (Rydgren, 2018, p. 26). The ultimate goal is an "ethnocracy", a democracy where citizenship is based on ethnicity (Mudde, 2019, p. 20). This argument is often found within the modern radical right-wing discourse, in contrast to traditional "old" extremist ideologies, which stressed the importance of hierarchical fascist understandings of racism and inferiority (Mudde, 2019, p. 14). Since the (populist) radical right has put nativism to the centre of their ideology, anti-immigration emerged as one of the core messages for those parties (Rydgren, 2018, p. 26). Additionally, the xenophobic character of nativism invokes anti-Muslim messages, which were strongly growing since 9/11 and account partly on the big success of those parties (Rydgren, 2018, p. 27). This is sometimes combined with antisemitism, although not all parties of the populist radical right are antisemitic (Mudde, 2019, p. 20). Nativism needs to be differentiated from nationalism. Since nationalism includes a civic and a political dimension (Mudde, 2007, pp. 16–17), one can argue that nationalism is the umbrella concept encompassing nativism. At the political level, nationalism includes the relationship to the European Union. Indeed, most populist radical right parties are at least

¹ <https://popu-list.org/about/>, accessed March 10 2021.

Eurosceptic. Yet, notable variation exists, also because most of those parties actually started as pro-EU parties and only became Eurosceptics later (Mudde, 2007, pp. 158–183).

The second core feature of right-wing radicalism is *authoritarianism*. Understood from a social psychological perspective, it is seen as trust in and obedience towards authorities, the belief in strictly ordered societies and the preference to control deviant behaviour through punishment (Mudde, 2007, pp. 22–23). Those who challenge the ‘natural order’ are seen as a threat, often including feminists who challenge the contemporary power structures of society (Gwiazda, 2020). Typically, authoritarians define problems in terms of law and order issues and argue that sexual deviance and drug addictions shall be tackled with tough punishments (Mudde, 2019, p. 20). Recent studies by Norris and Inglehart identify this new authoritarianism as one of the main forces behind the rise of right-wing populism, leading to the label of “authoritarian populism” (Norris, 2019; Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Yet, it seems to be more difficult to identify common authoritarian issues within the party family. Often, right-wing populists speak of “perverts” and “perverters” (Mudde, 2007, p. 67), which can be homosexuals, paedophiles, drug addicts/dealers and allegedly illegitimate receivers of social benefits (welfare chauvinism). However, apart from the problem that it is hard to define where this list starts and where it ends, the populist radical right is not really united here. For example, Dutch right-wing populists tend not to be homophobic, whereas right-wing populists from Catholic and Orthodox countries are (Mudde, 2007, pp. 67–68). In our project, we will analyse how the populist far right positions towards issues such as LGBTQ+ rights and gender equality to see if it a) united the party family and b) if they are also able to rally (potential) voters behind them.

The Far-Left Ideology

As for right-wing populism, we also need to focus on radicalism instead of extremism to analyse the ideological core of left-wing populism. In a broader sense, left parties put the strive for economic equality and redistribution at the centre of their ideology. Therefore, the radical left is strongly anti-capitalist since they reject the underlying socio-economic structure of contemporary capitalism. In addition, internationalism plays a decisive role for the radical left party family, in terms of networking, solidarity and the consequences for global power structure, e.g. through imperialism and globalisation (Keith & March, 2016, p. 5; March, 2011, pp. 8–9). Yet, within the far-left party family, one needs again to differentiate between radicalism and extremism. March suggests a rough distinction between communists and socialists and creates a typology consisting of five subtypes (March, 2011, pp. 16-20,18-19). He argues that communists are broadly split in extremist conservative communists, who remain largely uncritical towards the Soviet heritage, and more pragmatic (radical) reformist communists, who distanced themselves from critical Soviet elements, without abandoning the communist ideology. Socialist parties, in contrast, are much more pragmatic than communists, but more radical and leftist than social democratic parties, emphasising democratic principles. Consequently, those parties are all classified as radical, not extremist, and are candidates for left-wing populism. Here, two subtypes are of interest: populist socialists and social populists. Populist socialists adhere to similar combination of ideological concepts like democratic socialists, but fuel this ideology with strong populist ideas by relying on protest sentiment. Social populists, in contrast, are ideologically less coherent, in some cases not even easily classified as a left-wing party. They resemble classic Latin American populist movements, with strong personalised leadership and relatively weak degree of organisation. Yet, as March highlights, social populists are neither coherent nor long-term successful, thus largely irrelevant. Thus, populist socialists are best characterised as a combination of democratic socialism and populism. Just as (non-populist) democratic socialists, they are positioned left of social democracy, but, in contrast to communist, support parliamentary democracy. As the

core of the radical left, they are strongly anti-capitalist and pursue egalitarian politics (March, 2011, p. 118; March & Mudde, 2005, p. 35). Therefore, we identify two core concepts: economic egalitarianism and anti-capitalism.

Economic egalitarianism and Anti-Capitalism

In advocating economic equality and redistribution, radical left parties are much more *egalitarian* than centre-left or social democratic parties, which use semantically weaker constructs such as “social justice” or “equal opportunity” (March, 2011, p. 10). Thus, socio-economic egalitarianism issues are the most important issues for left-wing populists (March, 2017, pp. 285–286). Radical left parties see the current “neo-liberal” capitalism as the main obstacle to reach economic equality, which also hinders the development in many other areas. Instead, they promote an alternative economic system based on state intervention to enable welfarism, job creation/protection and wealth redistribution. Policy-wise, the radical left is opposing privatisation and classic state-controlled areas such as health, education and transport, supports and defends workers’ rights, (raising) minimum wages and opposes labour market deregulation. *Anti-capitalism* does not stop at the national border; the radical left explicitly says that due to capitalism’s imperialistic nature, free-trade agreements and international financial institutions such as the IMF need strict control. They see capitalism as a threat to global peace and oppose the NATO and military missions. For the EU, the radical left has a “social Europe” in mind, but strongly criticizes the current “market based” Europe (March, 2011, p. 202). In recent years, radical left parties also committed to issues from the “new left”, including environmentalism, feminism, minority rights protection and participation (including referendums). Yet, it seems that this trend is mainly affecting the policy of Western European radical right parties (March, 2011, p. 116). In Eastern Europe, especially in the cast of left-wing populists, those parties “tended to be a nationalistic cross-class phenomenon with leftist accents rather than something truly radical left [...]”, yet, “[...] relative socio-economic inequality and anti-elite distrust provide fertile ground issues for social populists to exploit” (March, 2011, p. 148).

3. Methodology and Case Study Selection

PRECEDE combines the following methodologies:

Firstly, it is analysing existing probability datasets; collecting and analysing newly generated data (objectives 1, 2 and 3; research question 1). In this project, the power to reach radical voters using online-based panels is combined with the robustness of probability sampling. In particular, the project (a) accesses (and later expands) existing email panels used by Kieskompas (our survey company partner) in the 10 selected countries to run our own surveys, (b) analyses the collected online-generated data in conjunction with probability datasets, and (c) runs additional analyses of probability datasets (European Social Survey, International Social Survey Programme etc) to complement empirical findings.

Secondly, it is disseminating and analysing Voting Advice Applications (objectives 3 and 4; research question 2). *PRECEDE* explores individuals’ voting intentions by analysing their responses to the Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) administered by Kieskompas during the forthcoming elections. VAAs give personalised advice to thousands, in some cases millions, of users across Europe regarding how their issue preferences compare to the policy stances of competing parties in an upcoming election (Marschall & Garzia, 2014). By completing VAAs, users share rich, valuable information on what attracts voters to populist parties based on socio-economic and cultural issues.

Through this innovative methodology PRECE is able to:

Collect new data during crucial times and access cross-national panels of voters: Out of the 10 countries in our study, 9 countries have scheduled general elections during the three-year period covered by our proposal and these elections will occur before the EU Parliament elections in 2024. Crucially, through our flexible method of online data collection, the project is also prepared to collect data during snap elections that tend to occur across Europe. Because for 8/10 countries PRECEDE can access longitudinal panels (e.g. EVES 2018), where panel participants have answered questions on previous national and EU elections (2009; 2014; 2019), PRECEDE can analyse parties' ideological shifts over time at the supply side against the backdrop of their changing electoral support. The unique panel structure also allows us to focus on those voters that swung towards populist parties during the most recent years and analyse their motivation to do so.

Test 'classic' and new set of explanations behind populism: As well as testing 'classic' cultural and socio-economic variables (e.g. authoritarianism, attitudes towards multiculturalism), in this study PRECEDE is in the unique position of using new sets of indicators to specifically explore socio-economic insecurity, labour market insecurity and individual wealth/income in conjunction with existing cultural and psychosocial indicators. In particular, our new socio-economic indicators on socio-economic insecurity have been tested in recent years with promising results (Antonucci et al., 2017, 2021). Through multilevel modelling, our analysis combines individual-level data with aggregate country-level measures (e.g. economic performance, welfare state spending and labour market policies).

Simultaneously collect demand and supply data: Normally, collecting voter-level and party-level data requires two different collection procedures, but VAA forms offer the unique opportunity to collect both types of data simultaneously. By analysing VAA data, PRECEDE can also aggregate policy preferences for parties and their voters into political positions within the two-dimensional political space of socio-economic and cultural factors (Marks et al, 2006). Our experimental survey will also allow us to identify the specific elements of populist parties' agendas that drive voters towards populism.

Case-study selection

The study analyses populism across 10 case-study countries, which the project chose for several reasons: (a) their national elections will occur during our project and before the next EU elections; (b) they represent different varieties of populism, namely from the left (e.g. *Podemos*, *Die Linke*, *La France Insoumise*), from the right (PVV, *Swedendemocrats*, *Rassemblement National*), in government (Czech Republic, Italy, Hungary), and in opposition (Germany, Spain, France); (c) they all have large existing email panels; (d) they represent a variety of welfare state regimes (Continental, Southern European, Nordic and Eastern European countries).

The study employs a most different systems design (MDSD), in that populist discourse is prominent in the political discourse of all countries, but the different countries present different manifestations of populism and welfare state models. The MDSD allows us to identify generalizable trends about populism in Europe that also apply to the other European countries not included in the study.

	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
UK						X
ITA					X	
NL			X			
GER			X			
SWE				X		
CZ			X			
ROM		X				
ESP					X	
FRA				X		
HUN				X		
Grant duration (June 2020 - May 2023)						

Figure 3: Scheduled EU and General Elections ('X') across the 10 countries of the study.

In addition to our ten case studies, we will also include secondary supplement cases. We have expertise in these countries since they were included in previous studies of our Consortium members before. Moreover, they will work as back up cases. Those countries roughly represent the main geographical regions and are: Austria, Belgium, Portugal, Denmark, Poland and Greece.

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APPENDIX

Methods/Models for Classifying Parties

Baseline Classification: The PopuList

We will first start our analysis by discussing the classification of parties in our case studies as radical right populist, radical left populist or centrist populist, based on the PopuList dataset. To clarify borderline cases, we will also include non-populist far-right and far-left parties.

Before we will discuss the results of this classification process, we will clarify potential caveats when interpreting the results to avoid confusion. The PopuList classifies extreme/non-mainstream political parties in 31 European countries with binary variables for populism, far right, far left, and/or Euroscepticism. To classify the parties, the project uses minimal definitions. For populism, Mudde's (2004) ideational definition is used: A party is considered populist if portrays society as ultimately split into two antagonistic and heterogeneous groups, the people and the elite, and argues that politics should follow the General Will of the people. The populist includes all parties that a) have been represented in parliament or have won at least 2 per cent of the votes in one election since 1989 and b) which are considered to be either populist, far-left, far-right or Eurosceptic.² From the inclusion criteria of the PopuList we can conclude that if a party won more than 2 per cent of the votes or have been represented in parliament since 1989 and is *not* included, it is classified as non-populist, non-far-right, non-far-left and non-Eurosceptic. We added vote- and seat-share from the ParlGov database (Döring & Manow, 2021) to identify non-populist parties.

Several trends are apparent when looking at the classification **Fehler! Verweisquelle konnte nicht gefunden werden.** First, most populist parties are indeed radical, either radical right or radical left. The category "centrist populists" is not very populated. Nevertheless, it contains highly relevant parties like Italian Forza Italia (former Popolo della Libertà), Italian MoVimento 5 Stelle or Greek ANEL – three parties that have recent government records. Second, as the absence of bold font shows, quite a lot of parties do not hold seats anymore (some only at the regional level like Italian LV). Some of them do not even exist anymore, which includes parties like Dutch Lijst Pim Fortuyn, who participated in government in 2002, but was resolved in 2008, as well as Austrian Team Stronach (TS), which managed to get 5.7 % of the votes in 2013, but did not participate in the 2017 elections and was dissolved afterwards. This highlights the historical perspective of the PopuList, which collects information on populist parties for all elections since 1990, including ideological shifts. Third, much more populist parties are radical right than radical left. None of the included Eastern

² See <https://popu-list.org/about/>, accessed July 8 2021.

European countries have left-wing populist parties. Finally, there are only four countries where right-wing and left-wing populists are in parliament: Germany (AfD & Linke), Netherlands (PVV, FvD & SP), Greece (EL, MR25 & Syriza) and France (DLF, RN & FI).

Country	Non-Populist Far-Right	Populist Radical Right	Non-Populist Far-Left	Populist Radical Left	Centrist Populist
United Kingdom		UKIP		R; SF	
Sweden		NyD; SD	V		
Spain		Vox	BNG ; CA; C AV ; EHB ; GCdE ; HB; IU	ECP ; EM; Podemos	
Romania		PRM; PRU; PUNR	PSM; PSoDR		PPDD
Netherlands		CD; FvD ; PVV		SP	LN; LPF
Italy	MSFT; MSI	FdI ; LN/L ; LAM	PdCI; PRC; RC; SEL / L		FI/PdL ; LV; M5S
Hungary	KDNP	FIDESZ ; Jobbik ; MIÉP; MH	MMP		
Germany		AfD		Linke	
France	RPF	DLR DLF ; FN / RN	PCF/FdG	FI	
Czech Republic		SPR-RSC; S-JB; SPD ; Dawn	KSCM ; KSC		ANO ; VV
Portugal		CH	BE ; CDU (PEV & PCP); PCP		
Poland	KORWiN ; RN ; ROP; UPR KNP	Kukiz '15 ; LPR; X; PiS	Razem ; PZPR; PZZ		SRP
Greece	Golden Dawn	EL ; LAOS; POLAN	KKE ; OE	DIKKI ; MR25 ; SYRIZA ; SYN	ANEL
Denmark		DF ; FrP; NB	En-O ; SF ; T		
Belgium		FN; Pp; VB	PVDA/PTB		LDD
Austria		BZÖ ; FPÖ			Martin; TS

Figure 4. Overview of Classifications of Parties in our Core and Supplement Case Studies (since 1990). Parties that held seats (early 2020) are marked bold.

Besides the PopuList, there are also other valuable expert classifications. The variables of interest can roughly be categorised by policy-related classifications, which aim to place the parties on several ideological dimensions such as Left vs. Right or GAL vs. TAN, specific policy dimensions (e.g. on immigration, EU integration) and populism-related classifications (through general placement and/or the combination of several subdimensions).

Name	Years	Ideological/Policy Placement?	Populism Placement?
Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (CHES)	1999-2019	Yes (clarity, saliency, dissent for EU policies, overall ideological placement and placement on different policies, depending on year)	Yes (1 general dimension, 2 salience measures; since 2017)
Global Party Survey	2019	Yes (ideological general placement and on different policies)	Yes (4 subdimensions, 1 general dimension, 1 salience measure)
POPPA	2018	Yes (general placement and on different policies)	Yes (8 subdimensions, 1 general dimension)
VDem	1970-2019 (historical placement)	Yes (general placement and on different policies)	Yes (1 general dimension, 2 subdimensions)
EU and I	2009/2014/2019	Yes (on specific policy statements, ca. 28, depending on year)	No

Figure 5. Overview of Party Expert Placements.

We summarise the data resources we identified as potentially useful the figure above. Most datasets contain information on measurements of both populism and ideology. The CHES dataset is primarily designed for ideological placement and offers placements on numerous subdimensions (Bakker et al., 2019). It is most useful to study party ideology in depth, but only started to include one populism variable and two salience variables in 2017. Yet, its strength is that it measures party positions for more than 20 years, allowing to analyse ideological shifts. In contrast, the POPPA dataset was primarily designed to measure the degree of party-level populism (Meijers & Zaslove, 2020). It measures populism across multiple subdimensions and allows for fine-grained analyses of populism, but offers only few ideological variables. The GPS tries to cover a middle way by measuring populism on one general dimension, four subdimensions as well as the salience of populist rhetoric. In addition, several ideological variables are also included in the dataset (Norris, 2020). The Varieties of Democracy (VDem) is another interesting project offering data on populism (Pemstein et al., 2021). In their dataset, VDem offers a two-dimensional measurement of populism based on people-centrism and anti-elitism and several ideological and policy placements. The strength of the dataset is that it includes retrospective historical data, also for populism, dating back to 1970. Finally, the European Voting Advice Application *EU and I* offers expert placement of parties on the most relevant parties for the EU elections 2009, 2014 and 2019 (Trechsel et al., 2019). Its methodology is different from the other expert surveys, since experts were asked to place the parties on around 28 issues per election based on text extracts (e.g. from manifestos) using a five-point scale, similar to the Kieskompas method that PRECEDE employs (Krouwel et al., 2012). The comparability is its strength, since 14 statements were included in all three elections, allowing to analyse positional change in detail.

To sum up, each dataset offers specific strengths and weaknesses. We will aim to combine the information of multiple datasets, which is in most cases facilitated through external IDs. As for the populism measurements, we are interested in the question to what extent the classifications of the different projects come to similar conclusions. In the final sections, we

will provide an overview over the aforementioned datasets and analyse to what extent different variables of different, but also of the same datasets are correlated.

Continuous Measures from Expert Surveys

These projects ask country experts about the positions of and the rhetoric used by political parties. The responses are averaged to produce measures of the party characteristics. In rare cases, those are further processed into IRT- or regression scores.

Chapel Hill Expert Survey

Bakker, Ryan, Liesbet Hooghe, Seth Jolly, Gary Marks, Jonathan Polk, Jan Rovny, Marco Steenbergen, and Milada Anna Vachudova. 2020. "1999 – 2019 Chapel Hill Expert Survey Trend File." Version 1.2. Available on chesdata.eu.

This study produces estimates of the party position along the major issue dimensions as well as the measures of relations to populism in 32 European countries. The estimates are the averages of expert responses to the corresponding questions. The variables related to populism include:

- Position on the role of the people and elected representatives in political decision-making (people_vs_elite)
- Saliency of anti-elite rhetoric (antielite_salience)
- Saliency of reducing political corruption (corrupt_salience)

Pairwise correlations between the variables in the countries included in the EVES sample are

	people_vs_elite	antielite_salience	corrupt_salience
people_vs_elite	1.00	0.79	0.35
antielite_salience	0.79	1.00	0.35
corrupt_salience	0.35	0.35	1.00

The saliency of the issues pertaining to reducing political corruption seems to be only loosely related to the other two variables.

Global Party Survey

Pippa Norris. The Global Party Survey, 2019. V1.0 www.GlobalPartySurvey.org

This study produces estimates of the party position along the major issue dimensions as well as the measures of populist rhetoric in 163 countries. The estimates are the averages of expert responses to the corresponding questions. "Populism is therefore treated minimally ... as a rhetoric making claims about the first order principles concerning the source of legitimate authority, emphasizing 'power to the people' and presenting a critique of the establishment, rather than presenting a set of coherent ideological beliefs about substantive public policies on issues like the economy, immigration, or nationalism." (codebook, page 9). The variables related to populism include:

- The extent of using populist rhetoric
- The saliency of populist rhetoric
- Position on whether the people or the leaders should make decisions (people_vs_elite)
- Emphasis on following the will of the people in the party's rhetoric
- Emphasis on the corruptness of the politicians in the party's rhetoric
- Position towards checks and balances on the executive powers

Pairwise correlations between the variables in the countries included in the EVES sample are

	populism	pop_salience	people_vs_elite	popwill_salience	corrupt_elite	checks_and_balances
populism	1.00	0.95	-0.38	-0.66	0.62	0.74

pop_salience	0.95	1.00	-0.38	-0.64	0.68	0.77
people_vs_elite	-0.38	-0.38	1.00	0.73	-0.57	0.02
popwill_salience	-0.66	-0.64	0.73	1.00	-0.54	-0.32
currupt_elite	0.62	0.68	-0.57	-0.54	1.00	0.37
checks_and_balances	0.74	0.77	0.02	-0.32	0.37	1.00

It appears that the “people_vs_elite” and “checks_and_balances” variables are further from the other populism-related variables in the Global Party Survey.

POPPA

Meijers, Maurits; Zaslove, Andrej, 2020, "Populism and Political Parties Expert Survey 2018 (POPPA)", <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/8NE>

Meijers, M. J., & Zaslove, A. (2020). *Measuring Populism in Political Parties: Appraisal of a New Approach*. *Comparative Political Studies*.L7B, Harvard Dataverse, V1

This study produces estimates of the party position along the major issue dimensions as well as the measures of populist rhetoric in 28 European countries. The estimates are the averages of expert responses to the corresponding questions. The variables related to populism include:

- Manichaeian worldview (manichean)
- Indivisibility of ordinary people (indivisible)
- Singularity of ordinary people's interests (generalwill)
- People-centrism (peoplecentrism)
- Anti-elitism (antielitism)
- Populism (computed using factor regression scores based on manichean, indivisible, generalwill, peoplecentrism, antielitism)

Pairwise correlations between the variables in the countries included in the EVES sample are

	populism	manichean	indivisible	generalwill	peoplecentrism	antielitism
populism	1.00	0.89	0.90	0.94	0.92	0.89
manichean	0.89	1.00	0.76	0.77	0.75	0.81
indivisible	0.90	0.76	1.00	0.93	0.74	0.67
generalwill	0.94	0.77	0.93	1.00	0.79	0.70
peoplecentrism	0.92	0.75	0.74	0.79	1.00	0.91
antielitism	0.89	0.81	0.67	0.70	0.91	1.00

Varieties of Democracy project

Lührmann, Anna, Nils Düpont, Masaaki Higashijima, Yaman Berker Kavasoglu, Kyle L. Marquardt, Michael Bernhard, Holger Döring, Allen Hicken, Melis Laebens, Staffan I. Lindberg, Juraj Medzihorsky, Anja Neundorf, Ora John Reuter, Saskia Ruth-Lovell, Keith R. Weghorst, Nina Wiesehomeier, Joseph Wright, Nazifa Alizada, Paul Bederke, Lisa Gastaldi, Sandra Grahn, Garry Hindle, Nina Ilchenko, Johannes von Römer, Daniel Pemstein, and Brigitte Seim. 2020. "Codebook Varieties of Party Identity and Organisation (V-Party) V1". *Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project*. <https://www.v-dem.net/en/data/data/v-party-dataset/>

This study produces estimates of the party position along the major issue dimensions as well as the measures of populist rhetoric in 169 countries. The estimates are Bayesian IRT estimates of expert responses to the corresponding questions. The variables related to populism include:

- People-centrism (v2papeople)
- Anti-elitism (v2paanteli)
- Demonization of political opponents (v2paopresp)

- Populism (v2xpa_popul, computed from v2paanteli_osp and v2papeople_osp)


Pairwise correlations between the variables in the countries included in the EVES sample are



	populism	peoplecentrism	antielitism	demonization
populism	1.00	0.81	0.93	-0.60
peoplecentrism	0.81	1.00	0.63	-0.67
antielitism	0.93	0.63	1.00	-0.49
demonization	-0.60	-0.67	-0.49	1.00

Comparison of measures

Pairwise correlations of the principal measures of populism

	gps.populism	poppa.populism	vdem.populism
gps.populism	1.00	0.87	0.76
poppa.populism	0.87	1.00	0.84
vdem.populism	0.76	0.84	1.00





The scatterplots show that all three measures are quite consistent with each other. The outliers are specific to the pairs of measures under consideration, except for the following:

- the Global Party Survey's measure returns a significantly higher score for
 - the Austrian People's Party
- the Global Party Survey's measure returns a significantly lower score for

- the Democratic Coalition in Hungary
- the POPPA's measure returns significantly higher scores for
- the Left Bloc in Portugal
 - the Unitary Democratic Coalition in Portugal
- the Varieties of Democracies' measure returns significantly lower scores for
- the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats in Romania
 - the National Liberal Party in Romania
 - the People's Movement Party in Romania

Pairwise correlations of the measures of people-centrism

	ches.people_vs_elite	gps.people_vs_elite	poppa.peoplecentrism
ches.people_vs_elite	1.00	-0.76	0.80
gps.people_vs_elite	-0.76	1.00	-0.64
poppa.peoplecentrism	0.80	-0.64	1.00

Pairwise correlations of the measures of anti-elitism

	ches.antielite_salience	gps.corrupt_elite	poppa.antielitism
ches.antielite_salience	1.00	0.79	0.88
gps.corrupt_elite	0.79	1.00	0.70
poppa.antielitism	0.88	0.70	1.00

Pairwise correlations of the measures of Manichaeian outlook

	poppa.manichean	vdem.demonization
poppa.manichean	1.00	-0.57
vdem.demonization	-0.57	1.00